Thursday, July 2, 2015

OVERVIEW ON MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATIONS

                                     Venugopala rao.V   CSA ,WSO-CSS Principal Consultant                                                                                                                                                                              NAGACONSULTANT&ENGINEERS,VISAKHAPATNAM,INDIA                                                                                                                   venu@nagace.com
Abstract
Fears generally prevail among public on environmental and personnel safety whenever any major hazard factory is planned to be set up. While this was the situation during yester-years, but with the stringent statutory controls and risk control measures and methodologies prevailing in all countries ; thanks to the  initiatives of ILO and other international agencies in this regard, these fears are being gradually nullified .A close look at some of the controls these hazardous factories are subjected to is focused here for the general information of the WSO readers.

1.      Preface:
 Among various categories of factories across the world, industries handling, storing and processing hazardous chemicals are well known for causing serious accidents resulting heavy loss of life. The disastrous accidents in Flexiborough (UK), Seveso, Italy and Bhopal, India, prompted European Union consisting of member nations & ILO to look into the problem and evolve suitable control measures to prevent any possible accidents in the industrial sectors. Accordingly the EU issued directives referred as Seveso Directives I, II & III. (Please see attachment 1) ILO in conjunction with UNEP( UNITED NATIONAS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME,WHO-IPCS (International Programme on Chemical Safety) published MAJOR HAZARD CONTROL SYSTEM-A PRACTICAL MANUAL in 1988.

2.      Toxic Substances (very toxic and toxic) [1]
Substances with the following toxicity values, physical and chemical properties which are capable of causing major accident hazards are brought under the purview of major hazard substances depending upon their storages.

LD50 Oral ln Rats LD50
Mg /kg body weight
LD50 Cutaneous in rats
or Rabbits Mg/kg body weight
LC50 inhalation (4 hours
In Rats mg/l (inhalation)
1
LD ≤50
LD50 ≤5 10
LC50 ≤ 0 .1
2
5 < LD 50 ≤ 25
10 < LD50  ≤5 50
01 <LC50 ≤ 0.5
3
25 < LD 50 ≤ 200
50 < LD50  ≤ 400
05 < LC50 ≤ 2
                                                         Table-1: Toxicity Values
1.Flammable Chemicals: Flammable gases ; chemicals which in the gaseous state at normal pressure and mixed with air become flammable and the boiling point of which at normal pressure is 200C or below;
2.  Highly flammable liquids; chemicals which have a flash point lower than 210 C and the boiling point of which at normal pressure is above 200C;
3.  Flammable liquids: chemicals which have a flash point lower than 550 C and which remain liquids under pressure, where particular processing conditions, such as high pressure and high temperature, may create major accident hazards.
3.  Explosives: chemicals which may explode under the effect of flame, heat or photo-chemical conditions or which are more sensitive to shocks or friction
For the properties and threshold capacities of hazardous substances please refer to the respective country legislation or refer Major Hazard Control-Practical Manual ILO publication1988for guidance.
3.      Typical Major Hazard Installations
As per Major Hazard Control-Practical Manual ILO publication, the following installations generally possess hazardous substances beyond the stipulated threshold quantities classifying them under MHI.
·         Petrochemical works and Refineries;
·         Chemical works and Chemical production plants;
·         LPG storage and terminals;
·         Stores and distribution centers for chemicals;
·         Large Fertilizer Stores;
·         Explosives factories;
·         Works in which Chlorine is used in bulk quantities
4.      Statutory Requirements
 Because of the severe consequences arise due to accidents in major hazard installations,in order to get ensured that the occupier of the MHI , is properly taking effective control over storages and manufacturing operations, the local Statutory Authority governing factories  requires essential documents as detailed below at certain intervals.
Table 2: Regulatory Compliance Schedule for MHI
Rule
Requirement
Frequency
Applicability
Required documents
Time to comply
Authority
Relevant Local Statute
Approval of facility& obtaining license

New projects
1.Safety report
2.On-site Emergency Plan
6 months before construction
commences
Local Regulatory Authority


Carrying out safety audit & submission of safety report
yearly once
New &Existing units
1.Safety audit report
2 Updated safety report
3.On-site emergency plan
1 month of completion of audit

Advance intimation
Existing units: in case of changes, decrease or increase in thresh hold quantity  of hazardous chemical
1.Updated Safety Report
2.Updated On-Site Emergency Plan

Before 3 months of making changes



5.      Safety Report
 Safety Report is one among the 3 important documents to be submitted by the Occupier to the statutory authority. It is a comprehensive document with plant layout, process description, and  construction safety features of plant, Safety Management system, Employee training, Onsite Emergency Plan details, general operational hazards, inventory of hazardous substances, loading & unloading operations and not the least complete details on Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) on use of the hazardous chemicals.
6.      Identification of Hazards.
In order to have an effective study on PHA, methodologies like HAZOP, HAZID, Accident consequence, Fault Tree Analysis, FMEA etc. will have to be employed depending on the operational status of the installation.
If MHI is in project stage Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study verifying with those of P & I diagrams and arriving at the Action Plan as per HAZOP Table 3. is a must identifying hazards during process operation through pipelines &Equipment s level with appropriate control Operations Stage:
HAZOP TABLE-3
Node:
Drawings
Sl.No
Guide Word

Causes

Consequences

Safeguards (Existing and Approved)
Further Mitigating Actions

Remarks








Risks generated out of HAZOP, HAZID can be further evaluated as per 8 Step Risk Assessment Process is given vide figure1 Risk Assessment Process
     

Figure -1 



8 STEP RISK ASSESSMENT (RA) PROCESS
Risk Matrix (Combining Impact and Likelihood

QUALITATIVE RISK CRITERIA
Table.4
LIKELYHOOD
LEVELS
RISK/IMPACT LEVELS
1
2
3
4
6
MINOR
MODERATE
SEVERE
MAJOR
CATWSTROPHIC
6
LIKELY
6
12
18
24
30
5
OCCASSIONAL
5
10
15
20
25
4
POSSIBLE
4
8
12
16
20
3
UNLIKELY
3
6
9
12
15
2
RARE
2
4
6
8
10
1
REMOTE
1
2
3
4
5


1
First Aid Injury
Minor Injury

Fatality/Multiple Fatalities


EXAMPLE :Likelyhoodof2(Possible)x Impact of (Minor)2=3x2=6 Dark Blue



                                     RISK & PLANNED CORRECTIVE ACTION


RISK LEVEL

CATEGORY
TOLERABILITY


1-2

VERY LOW
ACCEPTABLE


3-9

LOW
ACCEPTABLE


4-12

MEDIUM
TOLERABLE


15

HIGH
 UNACCEPTABLE


16 &ABOVE

VERY HIGH
UNACCEPTABLE

                                                                             TABLE:5                                                                                              LEGEND: RISK LEVELS
                Requires Priority Action
                Must be brought down to ALARP LEVEL
               Acceptable
Financial Risks/Impacts are not calculated in this Matrix levels


The Risk Matrix Diagram [2] given below is indeed a very useful tool in quickly assessing the severities and consequences.
Risk Matrix Nomogram: Figure.1.
Description: final_risk%20nomogram%20%5bConverted%5d
SFAP in the above chart stands for: `So Far As Practicable’ term used by (Victorian Australia Occupational Health and Safety Regulations).Equally ALARP  a term used in majority in UK and in other countries, can also be used alternatively.
Once the hazard assessment for all the hazardous substances during the process and bulk storage is completed, the information may then be tabulated as per the Table 6                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Sl.No
Incident
Scenario
Likelihood
Consequences
Risk Level
Correction Measures
Target Date
 For completion
Responsibility









RA CORRECTIVE ACTION TABLE -6
 This complete study Report with graphical representation viz.  risk curves and threat zones with calculation of individual and societal risks is called as Quantitative Risk Assessment and is an important document to be submitted to the Regulatory authority. (RA)  along with Safety report.Inorder to map the effects and risk curves, software models will be necessary .
 An example of gas release giving the accident scenarios and the effects thereon to the individual fatalities and society at large.is given vide   Sl.No VIII for  information of the readers.
7.      Scenario Examples:
7.1.    Bulk Storage of Propane: Consequences in case of accidental release of gas
A Chemical factory has bulk storage of Propane in a 150 KL Bullet installed within a dyke  A village is situated at a distance of 1KM With a  population density is about 20 persons / ha. The minimum distance of the village from the storage is 100 m. The village extends beyond the distance of 100 m from the storage. The village occupies 20% of the area within 100 m from the storage.The bullet is filled in by a road tanker depending on the necessity.
 Various Loss of Containment (LOC) probabilities can be thought of as under:
Ø  Vehicular Impact against pumps and pipes causing heavy leakage of Propane.
Ø  Static Spark
Ø  Tanker moves off with filling hose still connected to tank
Ø  Transfer hose not secured correctly during filling operation
Ø  External impact to tank wall or bund
Ø  Containment Failure & Consequences
Ø  Flange leakage
Ø  Lightening
Ø  Overfilling of Tank
Risk and severity consequences due to all probable incidences causing environmental, individual and societal risks are be  assessed without which; the HARA/PHA Report does not serve its purpose.
Assuming of an incident causing a release of continuous Flow of liquid propane, the following
 Example with certain dispersioneffects causing  individual and societal threats is given  for the general understanding of the readers
7.2.    THERMAL RADIATION AT THE THREAT ZONE
 Total mass of propane gas leaked out: 66 TONNES
   Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from jet fire
               10 meters --- (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec)
              Orange: 13 meters --- (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)
             Yellow: 20 meters --- (2.0 kW/(sq m) = pain within 60 sec)
2
Figure: 2  Model Dispersion Effects
ATMOSPHERIC DATA: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)
SITE DATA:
   Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.51 (unsheltered single storied)
 CHEMICAL DATA:
   Chemical Name: PROPANE                 Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol
   AEGL-1 (60 min): 5500 ppm   AEGL-2 (60 min): 17000 ppm   AEGL-3 (60 min): 33000 ppm
   IDLH: 2100 ppm     LEL: 21000 ppm      UEL: 95000 ppm
   Ambient Boiling Point: -43.5° C
   Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm
   Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%

   Wind: 5 miles/hour from ESE at 3 meters
   Ground Roughness: open country         Cloud Cover: 5 tenths
   Air Temperature: 60° F                 Stability Class: B
   No Inversion Height                    Relative Humidity: 50%
 SOURCE STRENGTH:
   Leak from hole in horizontal cylindrical tank
   Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank
   Tank Diameter: 8 meters                Tank Length: 10 meters
   Tank Volume: 503 cubic meters
   Tank contains gas only                 Internal Temperature: 60° F
   Chemical Mass in Tank: 2.13 tons      

7.3.    Individual & Societal Risks
                                                        i.            Estimation of the number of fatalities:: 12 fatalities  as per established calculation guidelines
                                                      ii.            Societal Risk Estimation of  frequency of occurrence: 10-4 accidents/year
8.      On-Site Emergency Plan
The Third document for submission to the RA is On-Site Emergency Plan
The overall objectives of an emergency plan are:
·         To localize the emergency and, if possible, eliminate it; and
·         To minimize the effects of the accident on people and property.
This Plan consists of management’s existing measures, onsite resources, to combat the emergency with trained manpower in first aid , firefighting and availability of fire protection systems.
9.      Conclusion
There is no industry in the world without any hazard. Much depends on the organization‘s  design features, its safety management system, employees’ operational practices , and their prompt actions to mitigate site emergencies  and finally the management’s compliance to such regulatory controls  play a larger role in preventing serious accidents and creating a sustained zero risk atmosphere.
Further Suggested Reading
Major Hazard Control-Practical Manual ILO publication
Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No 3-Risk Assessment
REFERENCES
.
[1] Major Hazard Control-Practical Manual ILO publication
[2] # Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Control Measures for Major Hazard Facilities published by Comcare . Gov. Au.
https://www.comcare.gov.au/__.../Hazard_identification_risk_as...















 ANNEXURE-1
Seveso Directive I, II and III

EUROPEAN UNION COMMISSION DIRECTIVES                                                                      Seveso Directives I, II and III                                                                                                                  Seveso I: Council Directive 82/501/EEC on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities (OJ No L 230 of 5 August 1982) – the so-called Seveso directive – was adopted in 1982. The Directive was amended twice, in 1987 byDirective 87/216/EEC of 19 March 1987 (OJ No L 85 of 28 March 1987) and in 1988 by Directive 88/610/EEC of 24 November 1988 (OJ No L 336 of 7 December 1988). Both amendments aimed at broadening the scope of the Directive, in particular to include the storage of dangerous substances. This was in response to severe accidents at the Union Carbide factory at Bhopal, India in 1984, where a leak of methyl isocyanate caused more than 2500 deaths, and at the Sandoz warehouse in Basel, Switzerland in 1986, where fire-fighting water contaminated with mercury, organophosphate pesticides and other chemicals caused massive pollution of the Rhine and the death of half a million fish.

Seveso II: On 9 December 1996, Council Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards – the so-called Seveso II Directive - was adopted and replaced the original Seveso Directive. Seveso II included a revision and extension of the scope; the introduction of new requirements relating to safety management systems; emergency planning and land-use planning; and a reinforcement of the provisions on inspections to be carried out by Member States.
In the light of industrial accidents (Toulouse, Baia Mare and Enschede) and studies on carcinogens and substances dangerous for the environment, the Seveso II Directive was extended by Directive 2003/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2003 amending Council Directive 96/82/EC. The most important extensions were to cover risks arising from storage and processing activities in mining; from pyrotechnic and explosive substances; and from the storage of ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate based fertilizers.
Seveso III: Further adaptation of the provisions on major accidents occurred on 4 July 2012 with publication of a replacement directive - 2012/18/EU. The main changes in this, so-called, Seveso III Directive were:
 
 


















Author Profile
Description: C:\Users\Venu\Documents\TTD RESERVATIONS\VVRPHOTOTTD PHOTO2.jpg
VENUGOPALA RAO VAKADA
Venugopala Rao is a Mechanical Engineer by Qualification, but a full-fledged ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH SAFETY & SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PROFESSIONAL having extensive experience over 40 years in varied industries covering  Petrochemicals, Refineries ,Viscose Rayon, Pesticide factories and Tobacco factories. Prior to present occupation, he worked as Group Manager(Risk Mgmt. & CSR) for a UK Based multinational Tobacco  Company, He is an EHS Auditor  trained by BAT & Rhone Poulenc industries, France and a certified Safety Auditor from Govt. of India, besides being an accredited  ISO 14001, OSHAS 18001 AND SA 8001 Auditor and a a Certified Safety Specialist from World Safety Organization, USA  He is A COMPETENT PERSON approved by Govt. of India under Petroleum Regulations. He is currently an Associate Member of International Institute of Risk & Safety Management, UK and Affiliate Member of World Safety Organization, USA  . Presently He is Principal Consultant of his Consultancy Firm NAGA CONSULTANTS & ENGINEERS, INDIA( URL: www.nagace.com)
Readers may contact him via his email venu@nagace.com Mobile: +919676612929 for any clarifications, consulting assignments or assistance.